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Introduction 
In eBay v. MercExchange,1 the Supreme Court correctly rejected the 
Federal Circuit’s general rule requiring that a permanent injunction fol-
low from a finding that a patent is valid and infringed. Recognizing that 
one size does not fit all in patent law, the Court returned traditional equi-
table discretion to the district courts. With this discretion, district courts 
can now deploy remedies for patent infringement that are sensitive to 
relevant differences among industries, technologies, and entities. 
This Essay sets the Court’s rejection of a uniform remedial regime in 
a larger context concerning the role of uniformity in patent law. It then 
explores the Court’s own reasons for rejecting a one-size-fits-all ap-
proach to injunctive relief. Finally, it analyzes the salient differences that 
                                                                                                                      
 *
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draft. 
 1. 547 U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006). 
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deserve attention from patent courts and summarizes these in a set of 
guidelines that can be used for evaluating the propriety of permanent 
injunctive relief in patent cases. 
I. One Size Does Not Fit All 
A. The Uniformity Presumption 
In its early years, the Federal Circuit applied the traditional, context-
sensitive balancing test used for assessing whether to grant permanent 
injunctive relief.2 Over time, however, that test became short-circuited by 
a “general rule that courts will issue permanent injunctions against pat-
ent infringement absent exceptional circumstances.”3 This “general rule” 
reflected a uniformity presumption that appears to run throughout patent 
law. 
According to the uniformity presumption, all patents and patentees 
should be treated alike. In a formal sense, the Patent Act largely con-
forms to this view. With a few statutory exceptions,4 the law grants every 
inventor the rights to exclude others from making, using, offering for 
sale, selling or importing the invention without regard to the context in 
which an invention has taken place.5 Thus, even though the Patent Act 
explicitly makes injunctive relief discretionary,6 the uniformity presump-
tion demands that such discretion should be held in reserve for 
exceptional cases. In other words, a patent is a patent, and if it has been 
infringed the same remedy should apply in all cases. 
If patent law were truly this uniform in substance, however, it would 
impede rather than stimulate innovation. In fact, all patents are not alike, 
nor should they be. In One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in 
Intellectual Property Law,7 I argue that the central policy challenge in 
intellectual property law is to manage the problems caused by granting 
rights to innovators on a one-size-fits-all basis. The remainder of this 
section briefly summarizes that argument for purposes of evaluating the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in eBay. 
                                                                                                                      
 2. See Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharma. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 865–67 (Fed. Cir. 
1984). 
 3. MercExchange L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev’d in 
part, 547 U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006). 
 4. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (differential treatment for federally funded patent-
ees); id. § 287(c) (limiting remedies against medical practitioners for infringement in 
connection with medical activities). 
 5. Id. § 271(a). 
 6. See id. § 283 (courts with jurisdiction may grant injunctions). 
 7. Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual 
Property Law, 55 Am. U. L. Rev. 845 (2006). 
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The law grants patents to inventors to encourage technological inno-
vation. While addressing an appropriability problem faced by innovators, 
these intellectual property rights create a different problem by supplying 
rightsholders with powerful weapons against end-users, direct competi-
tors, and follow-on innovators who seek to bring socially beneficial 
innovations to market. To promote progress, patent law must strike a bal-
ance, providing sufficient incentives for innovation without unduly 
stifling the efforts of follow-on innovators or the liberties of end-users. 
This balance must be sensitive to the problems the law seeks to 
solve. In the modern context, innovators’ needs for patent protection vary 
substantially across industries and among types of innovation.8 Since 
patent rights impose some costs on society, such as higher prices, using 
uniform rights to solve innovators’ problems, which differ in magnitude, 
necessarily gives rise to the problem of uniformity cost in patent law.9 
Thankfully, giving each patent owner the same legal rights does not 
mean that each patentee receives the same economic rewards from inno-
vation.10 A number of market-based features of the patent system 
partially ameliorate the uniformity cost problem. Differences in demand 
for patented inventions, variations in the allocation of patent rights 
through licensing, and a patent owner’s ability to serve a wider market 
through differential pricing (price discrimination) all contribute to align-
ing the rewards that patent owners receive with the value contributed to 
society. Nevertheless, these features are only partial solutions because 
the high costs of licensing or otherwise transacting in relation to patents 
causes patent rights to remain in the wrong hands.11 As a result, society 
pays too much for numerous innovations that would have been created 
with less robust protection, while in other cases patent rights are less 
extensive than would be necessary to induce the creation of certain 
costly but socially desirable inventions.12 
Once one acknowledges the problem of uniformity cost in current 
patent law, one also realizes that the ideal solution to the problem would 
be perfectly tailored patents. That is, if intellectual property rights were 
the only available tool to induce inventive activity, the ideal implementa-
tion would be rights that promised the expected value necessary to 
                                                                                                                      
 8. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. L. 
Rev. 1575, 1581–83 (2003) (comparing the pharmaceutical industry which requires a large 
research and development (“R&D”) budget to the computer software industry which can oper-
ate on a much smaller budget). 
 9. Carroll, supra note 7, at 847. 
 10. Imagine the inefficiencies that would result if all inventors were given the same 
amount of money as a reward for their respective contributions to society regardless of 
whether the invention were a novelty toy or a life-saving medicine. 
 11. See Carroll, supra note 7, at 857–60 (describing transaction cost problem). 
 12. Id. at 860. 
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induce investment only in those innovations that would yield society a 
net positive return (measured dynamically) on the patent grant. Tailoring 
patents could affect the substance of the patent rights—notably their 
scope and duration—or the remedies for violation of such rights. While 
patents for some innovators would carry a traditional property rule—the 
right to obtain an injunction—others might be protected only by a right 
to receive a royalty or damages.  
As desirable as perfectly tailored patents are, we can’t always get 
what we want. Customizing patent protection on a case by case basis 
would be impossible for a variety of reasons, including ex ante uncer-
tainty about innovation, information asymmetries between policymakers 
and innovators, the administrative costs of tailoring, and the political 
economy of intellectual property policymaking. These generally are the 
reasons advanced to justify why the formal articulation of patent rights 
in current law is highly uniform. Nevertheless, the uniformity cost per-
spective demonstrates that context-sensitivity is desirable in patent law’s 
formation and application. A middle-ground solution that deserves 
greater attention would be to tailor patents categorically along industry-
specific or technology-specific grounds. 
B. Limits on the Uniformity Presumption 
Indeed, Congress has adopted three kinds of measures to mitigate 
the problem of uniformity cost. First, the Patent Act already tailors the 
rights by treating certain classes of invention or inventor differently.13 
Second, even when rights are nominally uniform, Congress has made 
obtaining and keeping patent rights optional. By doing so, these real op-
tions reduce the uniformity problem by requiring self-selection among 
inventors. Only those who believe their inventions possess sufficient pre-
sent value pursue a patent or maintain it once it has been obtained.14 As a 
result, a great deal of patentable information flows into the public do-
main far sooner than it would were all patentable information 
automatically subject to a full uniform term.15 
For present purposes, the third and most important policy Congress 
has adopted is to use flexible standards to define patent rights. These 
standards govern the eligibility criteria for a patent, the legal scope of a 
patent, and the remedies for infringement, including the remedial provi-
sion at stake in eBay. Many of these provisions—dubbed patent law’s 
                                                                                                                      
 13. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (relaxing exclusive right to use to enable generic 
pharmaceutical manufacturer to seek regulatory approval); id. § 287(c) (limiting remedies for 
infringement of certain medical process patents); id. §§ 200–212 (Bayh-Dole Act’s special 
provisions for federally-funded patentees).  
 14. See id. at 879–85. 
 15. Id. 
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“policy levers” by Professors Burk and Lemley16—require a court to 
evaluate the invention and its disclosure from the perspective of a person 
having ordinary skill in the art of the invention. The level of skill will 
vary by field of invention. As a result, patents will be more easily ob-
tained in some fields than in others, and the field of invention will affect 
patent breadth. 
With respect to the flexible remedial standard at issue in eBay, the 
question from the uniformity cost perspective is whether courts should 
take account of facts and circumstances beyond the fact that a patent has 
been infringed when evaluating the suitability of injunctive relief. This 
inquiry is of a kind with that which arises when courts apply the flexible 
doctrines governing patent scope. 
From a legal perspective, the scope of a patent is defined by the 
range of activities that would be infringing. While there is debate about 
whether the Federal Circuit has interpreted the legal standards governing 
legal scope to yield industry-specific differences in application,17 the 
large majority of commentators agree that the flexible standards necessi-
tate some variation in application across fields. 
From a business perspective, however, the scope of a patent is its 
threat value. The threat value is comprised of a patent’s perceived legal 
scope accompanied by the available remedies for infringement. To the 
extent that courts limit their flexibility in interpreting the provisions that 
define a patent’s threat value, they intensify the problem of uniformity 
cost in patent law. 
It is for this reason that the Federal Circuit’s “general rule” requiring 
a trial court to issue a permanent injunction upon findings of patent va-
lidity and infringement was problematic.18 Thus, the Supreme Court’s 
intervention rejecting this rule was welcome. However, the Court’s own 
reasons for intervening in eBay were only obliquely responsive to the 
problem of uniformity cost. Indeed, the Court sought to reaffirm its own 
uniformity presumption—that general remedial rules are inappropriate 
                                                                                                                      
 16. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 8. 
 17. Compare Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology Specific?, 17 
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1155, 1196–1202 (2002), Burk & Lemley, supra note 8, at 1593, and 
Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Biotechnology’s Uncertainty Principle, 54 Case W. Res. L. 
Rev. 691 (2004), with R. Polk Wagner, (Mostly) Against Exceptionalism, in Perspectives On 
Properties Of The Human Genome Project 367 (F. Scott Kieff ed., 2003), and R. Polk 
Wagner, Comment: Exactly Backwards: Exceptionalism and the Federal Circuit, 54 Case W. 
L. Rev. 749, 755–56 (2004). 
 18. Acknowledging that its uniformity presumption short-circuited necessary remedial 
fact-finding, the Federal Circuit already has remanded some cases to district courts for further 
consideration in the wake of eBay. See Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1342 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006); Int’l Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 188 Fed. Appx. 1001, 2006 WL 2036676 (Fed. 
Cir. Jul. 14, 2006) (non-precedential).  
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and the availability of injunctive relief should be determined case by 
case in the absence of exceptional circumstances.19 
II. EBAY’s Oblique Recognition of Uniformity Cost 
Having recognized that one size does not fit all in patent law, the 
Court in eBay could have done more to explain why this matters. The 
balance that patent law strikes between creating incentives to innovate 
and providing access to new inventions depends on context. Courts are 
unlikely to be able to effectively adapt the law to different contexts on a 
case by case basis for the same reasons that make customized patents 
infeasible. Instead, there are features of patent law that will cause the 
cases to cluster, and these features should be taken into account in the 
exercise of the district court’s remedial discretion. 
This section analyzes the Court’s reasoning in eBay on its own terms 
to identify why the Court found the Federal Circuit’s uniform approach 
to patent injunctions to be problematic. Section III then merges this 
analysis with the theory of uniformity cost from Section I to set forth 
functional guidelines for applying the traditional equitable factors for 
injunctive relief in a way that ameliorates the costs of uniform patent 
rights.  
A. eBay Is about Patent Policy 
The Court’s holding in eBay is quite straightforward: “[T]he deci-
sion whether to grant or deny injunctive relief rests within the equitable 
discretion of the district courts, and [] such discretion must be exercised 
consistent with traditional principles of equity, in patent disputes no less 
than in other cases governed by such standards.”20 Thus, there is no gen-
eral rule that applies to permanent injunctive relief in patent cases. 
Instead, the patentee must demonstrate: 
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury;  
(2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are 
inadequate to compensate for that injury; 
(3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plain-
tiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and 
                                                                                                                      
 19. See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1841 (2006). 
 20. Id. at 1841. 
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(4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent 
injunction.21 
As simple and as expected as this holding was, there is more to the 
decision than initially meets the eye. The case below involved a range of 
issues, and the Federal Circuit addressed the question of injunctive relief 
in little more than one page of its 17-page opinion.22 Leaving the bulk of 
the Federal Circuit’s analysis undisturbed, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to decide only the issue of whether the Patent Act calls for a 
“general rule that courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent 
infringement absent exceptional circumstances.”23 
Why did the Court take this case? When looked at in the context of 
the recent lively conversation between the Court and the Federal Circuit, 
three possibilities suggested themselves at the time of the grant of certio-
rari. First, this would be a general jurisprudential intervention to rebuff 
the Federal Circuit for its formalist attachment to rules rather than stan-
dards. One can argue that this was at least one motivation for Court’s 
earlier intervention in Festo Corp. v Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki 
Co.,24 when it replaced the Federal Circuit’s absolute bar to the doctrine 
of equivalents in certain circumstances with a presumption against its 
application. 
A second reading of the grant was that the Court felt obliged to chas-
tise the Federal Circuit for its tendency to treat patent law as exceptional, 
particularly when such a stance gives the Federal Circuit license to take 
exception to general rules that require an appellate court to defer to other 
decisionmakers. On this reading, eBay would simply become the com-
panion case to Dickinson v. Zurko,25 in which the Court overruled the 
Federal Circuit’s view that it was exempt from the Administrative Proce-
dure Act’s normal rule of deference to agency fact finding. 
Had the Court taken the case for either of these reasons, the opinion 
should have been a single paragraph. On either of these views, the Court 
simply would have said that according to the plain language of the Patent 
Act, “the several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may 
grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent 
                                                                                                                      
 21. Id. at 1839. 
 22. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 23. The court further sought briefing on whether it should overrule its decision in Con-
tinental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908), which rejected the 
contention that a court of equity lacked jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief to a patent holder 
who had unreasonably declined to use a patent. See eBay, 546 U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 733 (2005) 
(granting certiorari). By citing Continental, the Court implicitly affirmed it as good law. See 
eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1840. 
 24. 535 U.S. 722 (2002). 
 25. 527 U.S. 150 (1999). 
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the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court 
deems reasonable.”26 The word “may” means may, and the “principles of 
equity” require the four-factor balancing of interests. Therefore, under 
general rules of statutory construction, the statute does not allow for a 
general rule in favor of injunctive relief and district courts must exercise 
the remedial discretion granted by the statute subject to the traditional 
four-factor test. 
A third reading of the grant, however, was that the Court accepted 
the case because it disagreed with the Federal Circuit’s judgment that 
good patent policy required a general rule favoring injunctive relief as a 
response to patent infringement. This is certainly the interpretation 
adopted by the parties and the numerous amici, who represented most of 
the sectors of the economy substantially affected by the patent system, 
along with a range of scholarly and public interested amici.27 The briefs 
in the case proceeded from the assumption that relying on plain-
language statutory construction would be an inappropriately formalist 
basis for deciding the case. The Court instead should decide the case on 
the basis of how the standard for injunctive relief under the Patent Act 
would affect innovation.28 
Indeed, in its opinion, the Court explained that it was unpersuaded 
that innovation would benefit from a presumption of uniformity in this 
context. It then provided some instruction about how the traditional equi-
table factors should be applied to further the goals of the Patent Act. The 
Court shared some of the concerns expressed by the district court and the 
business press that MercExchange and similarly situated non-producing 
patent owners—particularly owners of business method patents—may be 
acting as “patent trolls” who use the threat of injunctive relief to collect 
tribute from innovative passersby with no meaningful pass-through to 
the general public. This concern, however, does not support a general 
                                                                                                                      
 26. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2004) (emphasis added). 
 27. See generally Peter S. Menell, The Property Rights Movement’s Embrace of Intel-
lectual Property: True Love or Doomed Relationship? (Working Paper, Feb. 2007), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=965083. For the record, I did not sign 
any of the amicus briefs (reviewing role played by property rights advocates and those 
alarmed by the expansion of business method patents, respectively, in attracting the Court’s 
attention to this case). For the record, I did not sign any of the amicus briefs. 
 28. See, e.g., Brief of Time Warner et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 4, 
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130), available at 
http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/eBayTimeWarner.pdf (“The automatic injunction rule can 
lead to grossly inequitable results affecting technology-dependent businesses.”); Brief of 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America in Support of Respondent at 5, eBay, 
126 S. Ct. 1837 (No. 05-130), available at http://patentlaw.typepad.com/eBay/ 
MercPhRMA.pdf (“The pharmaceutical industry depends for its very existence upon strong, 
reliable patent protection including the general rule that injunctive relief will be granted 
against patent infringers absent exceptional circumstances.”). 
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rule against granting relief to such patentees. The seven justices concur-
ring with the Court went even further along these lines, though in 
arguably different directions. 
B. The Opinions 
The Court. In Justice Thomas’s opinion for the Court, rights and 
remedies are distinct.29 Congress exercised its constitutional option to 
secure to inventors the exclusive right to their discoveries by enacting 
patent law and by declaring that patents should have the “attributes” of 
chattels subject to statutory limitations and the traditional remedial 
rules.30 If the general right has been infringed, however, a more context-
specific inquiry must follow before judicially excluding a particular 
member of the public, the defendant, from such practice.31 
The reason is that the statute subjects enforcement of the general 
right to the traditional rule under which injunctive relief is an extraordi-
nary remedy available only when the plaintiff has made the four-factor 
showing set forth above.32 While many, perhaps most, patentees will be 
able to make this showing readily, there will be some cases in which a 
monetary remedy will be adequate compensation in light of the goals of 
the Patent Act, and there will be others in which progress will be better 
served by permitting the defendant’s practice to continue either because 
the balance of hardships or the public interest calls for this result. 
Turning to the question of whether application of the traditional 
four-factor test in specific contexts might yield predictable outcomes, the 
Court took up two contexts identified by the district court: a patentee’s 
willingness to liquidate its actual or potential claim against another in a 
license, and a patentee’s failure to engage in commercial activity to prac-
tice the patent.33 The Court found that “traditional equitable principles do 
not permit such broad classifications”34 for purposes of yielding a cate-
gorical rule applicable to these contexts. While willingness to license is 
certainly relevant to the inquiry, patent holders such as university re-
searchers or self-made inventors who rely on licensing “may be able to 
satisfy the traditional four-factor test.”35 
The Chief Justice, concurring. The Chief Justice, joined by 
Justices Scalia and Ginsburg, concurred in order to warn that, although 
                                                                                                                      
 29. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1840. 
 30. Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 261). 
 31. Id. 
 32. See note 21, supra, and accompanying text. 
 33. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1840–41. 
 34. Id. at 1840. 
 35. Id.; see also infra p. 25 (suggesting that the test is likely to be satisfied when a pat-
ent owner has engaged in productive licensing). 
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the district court’s classifications in this case may have been overbroad, 
the traditional factors do not truly call for case-by-case adjudication be-
cause their application is limited by “ ‘the basic principle of justice that 
like cases should be decided alike.’ ”36 He further noted that courts have 
granted injunctive relief upon a finding of infringement in the vast ma-
jority of cases decided since the early nineteenth century.37 The import of 
this observation, however, is left to the reader’s imagination. Perhaps, 
this is an embrace of the uniformity presumption, in which case the 
opinion is a concurrence in name only. It is difficult to know because 
instead of offering the district courts principles for classification, The 
Chief Justice invoked an increasingly favored judicial nostrum in intel-
lectual property cases: “ ‘a page of history is worth a volume of logic.’ ”38 
Since the history of patent law can be read in many ways, The Chief Jus-
tice’s enigmatic reasoning provides little additional guidance to district 
courts seeking to determine whether a case at bar is like any particular 
precedent. 
Justice Kennedy, concurring. Justice Kennedy, writing for a plu-
rality comprised additionally of Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, 
concurred to offer an interpretation of The Chief Justice’s invocation of 
historical practice and to provide further guidance to district courts.39 
Since the subject matter of patents has expanded rapidly in recent years, 
historical practice may be of greatest utility when “the circumstances of 
a case bear substantial parallels to litigation the courts have confronted 
before.”40 District courts, however, now face a range of patent cases with 
no ready analogy to prior judicial practice. Justice Kennedy identified 
three classes of case in which district courts should be skeptical about 
the appropriateness of injunctive relief. 
First, he echoed the district court’s concern about granting injunc-
tions to non-producing entities, but he focused this concern on those 
plaintiffs whose primary method of doing business is to purchase patents 
for purposes of threatening litigation in order to secure a licensing reve-
nue stream. The ready availability of injunctive relief can lead to 
“exorbitant” licensing fees.41 Second, Justice Kennedy called attention to 
cases in which the patented invention is a small component of an infring-
ing product. In such cases, “legal damages may well be sufficient to 
                                                                                                                      
 36. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1841–42 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (quoting Martin v. Franklin 
Capital Corp., 546 U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 704, 710 (2005)). 
 37. Id. at 1841. 
 38. Id. at 1842 (quoting N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, 
J.)); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 200 (2003) (relying on “a page of history” to 
explain its constitutional interpretation). 
 39. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1842 (Kennedy, J.) (concurring). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
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compensate for the infringement and an injunction may not serve the 
public interest.”42 Finally, district courts should be particularly sensitive 
to the consequences of issuing injunctions in cases involving business 
method patents, a burgeoning class comprised of a subset that are poten-
tially vague and of suspect validity.43 
These classes are not the only ones requiring special scrutiny from 
trial courts because “[t]he equitable discretion over injunctions, granted 
by the Patent Act, is well suited to allow courts to adapt to the rapid 
technological and legal developments in the patent system.”44 
III. Applying EBAY  
The Supreme Court’s intervention in eBay was a welcome recogni-
tion that the patent system requires context-sensitivity to function well. 
However, more needs to be said about how a district court can balance 
its sensitivity to the nuances of a case at bar while staying true to the 
principle that like cases should be decided alike. To aid in this difficult 
task, this section first identifies functional considerations that should 
guide a trial court’s exercise of discretion when applying the traditional 
four factors to promote the purposes of the Patent Act. This section then 
identifies means of mapping these considerations to classifications based 
on industry, technology, or entity to ensure that the court treats like cases 
alike. 
A. Functional Principles of Equity after eBay 
The Court’s holding in eBay specified the standard for permanent in-
junctive relief in patent cases. Some questions linger concerning the 
implications of the holding for preliminary injunction jurisprudence in 
patent law, as well as its effects on the standards for both preliminary 
and permanent injunctions in copyright and trademark cases.45 Full dis-
cussion of these matters is beyond the scope of this Essay. 
Nonetheless, the Court’s rejection of the Federal Circuit’s “general 
rule” should be read as a more general rejection of the uniformity pre-
sumption with respect to equitable remedies in intellectual property 
cases. Thus, for example, courts should no long presume that a plaintiff 
will suffer irreparable harm if a preliminary injunction does not issue 
                                                                                                                      
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Professor Joe Miller is tracking the post-eBay cases on his weblog. See Joseph 
Scott Miller, Injunctions, http://www.thefireofgenius.com/injunctions (last visited Mar. 23, 
2007). 
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even after the plaintiff has shown a likelihood of success on the merits.46 
Relatedly, the discussion that follows is also relevant to the preliminary 
injunction factors in patent cases, as well as to equitable remedies in 
copyright and trademark cases. 
1. Plaintiff’s Irreparable Injury and the Adequacy of Damages 
The first two factors in the equitable inquiry for permanent injunc-
tions are related. Both ask whether infringement causes an irreparable 
injury, which is to say that the defendant has caused or is likely to cause 
harm to the plaintiff for which damages would be inadequate. The ir-
reparable-injury prong is prospective, while the adequacy-of-damage 
prong is retrospective. A plaintiff’s injury is irreparable or damages are 
inadequate when a court is sufficiently uncertain about its ability to as-
certain the value the plaintiff has placed on the right that has been 
infringed by the defendant.47 
A first question a court should ask is how old the patent is. Patents 
that are the subject of litigation tend to be relatively recently granted.48 
As a general matter, damages will tend to be inadequate for infringe-
ments of a recently-granted patent. Almost by definition, if the invention 
claimed in the patent is new, then its market value is likely to be difficult 
to ascertain. It turns out that as patents mature, most inventions prove to 
have little or no market value.49  
Patent maturity is relative to the field of invention or the patentee’s 
industry.50 In fast-growing industries, such as those in the information 
technology sector, many inventions lose their market value quickly as 
new and better inventions emerge. By contrast, in the pharmaceutical 
industry, the long regulatory approval process delays the test of market 
                                                                                                                      
 46. See, e.g., Ranbaxy Pharm. Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 350 F.3d 1235, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) (holding that a rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm arises after a “clear showing” 
of validity and infringement). 
 47. See, e.g., Gene R. Shreve, Federal Injunctions and the Public Interest, 51 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 382, 393 (1983) (“The adequate-remedy-at-law formulation poses the ques-
tion: is it fair to permit plaintiff to seek an injunction when plaintiff could have selected a less 
onerous remedy—perhaps damages—that would, in a rough sense, protect the same interests? 
The irreparable-injury formulation poses the somewhat different question: are there other 
noninjunctive proceedings that are likely to repair, in a rough sense, the harm plaintiff seeks to 
avert by injunction?”). 
 48. See John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 Geo. L.J. 435, 460 (2004). 
 49. Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1521 (2006); 
Allison et al., supra note 48, (identifying the characteristics of the small set of valuable pat-
ents). 
 50. Thanks to Chris Cotropia for this reminder. 
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value and the discovery of so-called “off label” uses can further increase 
the value of a mature patent.51 
The patent owner’s post-grant treatment of the patent will affect 
whether a court can reasonably measure the harm of infringing conduct. 
For example, where the patentee has commercialized the patent by us-
ing, making, or selling embodiments of the invention—or has granted an 
exclusive license for another to do so—damages caused by an infringer’s 
entry into the market are likely to be an inadequate remedy.52 In such 
cases, it may be possible, though difficult, to ascertain lost sales or the 
infringer’s profits attributable to infringement. But the patentee and the 
court would have to speculate to value the loss of goodwill and loss of 
licensing opportunities, including, for example, the opportunity to cross 
license. Moreover, patent policy favors a finding of irreparable injury in 
such circumstances because the practice of an invention generally pro-
motes the progress of science and useful arts.53 
One might question, as The Chief Justice did, why commercializa-
tion of the patent should be relevant to the irreparable injury inquiry 
since the patent grants all owners a right to exclude others from using the 
patent.54 This is because, although Congress has declared that patents 
shall have the attributes of personal property, patent law grants such 
rights for reasons quite different from the reasons that the law enforces 
the exclusive rights of one who owns real or personal property. The very 
reason that the Constitution empowered Congress to grant inventors ex-
clusive rights, and the very reason that Congress has done so since 1790, 
is to encourage inventors to innovate with an eye toward entering the 
market to enjoy monopoly profits.55 When an infringer enters the market 
                                                                                                                      
 51. See generally Steven R. Salbu, Off-Label Use, Prescription, and Marketing of FDA-
Approved Drugs: An Assessment of Legislative and Regulatory Policy, 51 Fla. L. Rev. 181 
(1999) (describing off label uses and arguments for and against regulation of these practices). 
 52. Accord Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking 34 
(Working Paper, July 2006), available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/stacking.pdf. 
 53. Cf. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (“Innovation, 
advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a 
patent system which by constitutional command must ‘promote the Progress of . . . useful 
Arts.’ ”) (citation omitted). 
 54. See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1841 (2006) (Roberts, 
C.J., concurring) (suggesting that patentee’s showing of irreparable harm under first two fac-
tors should be easy to make since monetary remedies unlikely to adequately substitute for a 
right to exclude). 
 55. Patents rarely confer the power of a true monopoly in the sense of control over a 
market for which there are no ready substitutes. Instead patentees generally face monopolistic 
competition, in which users of an innovation can turn to imperfect substitutes if necessary. 
Under such conditions, the patentee can still charge prices higher than would be the case in a 
truly competitive market because the patent excludes competitors from selling identical goods 
or practicing a patented process. 
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to threaten those profits, the injury cuts to the quick, for it undermines 
the very purpose for rewarding inventors with patents in the first place. 
In the case of the non-practicing entity, the patentee who has under-
taken efforts to commercialize an invention through productive licensing 
should be distinguished from those who have not. By “productive licens-
ing,” I mean proactively seeking out parties whose processes or products 
could be improved by incorporating the invention. Infringement in these 
cases is likely to curtail or devalue the patentee’s licensing opportunities 
in ways that are difficult to measure, and it is therefore appropriate to be 
disposed toward a finding of irreparable injury in such cases. 
In contrast, a monetary award is more likely to adequately repair the 
injury suffered by either non-practicing entities or patentees who have 
created a reasonably ascertainable market rate for licensing a particular 
invention. For example, a non-practicing entity whose patent falls into 
the large class of patents that lack market value is less likely to face ir-
reparable injury if the patent is infringed. For present purposes, it is 
unnecessary to decide whether such entities deserve to be labeled as 
“patent trolls” for the same reasons that Justice Kennedy refrained from 
using the term while expressing the common concerns about vague and 
doubtful patents and strategic behavior that lie behind the charge.56  
In these situations, an infringer probably does not inflict the kinds of 
intangible injuries, such as loss of competitive position, harm to good-
will, or loss of licensing opportunities, for which damages are likely to 
be inadequate. As a result, courts should be particularly sensitive to the 
dangers posed by the threat of injunctive relief. In addition to the usual 
                                                                                                                      
 56. The term “patent troll” often is used to describe patent-owning firms whose primary 
business is to acquire and assert patents in order to secure licensing revenues. See, e.g., James 
R. Farrand, Territoriality and Incentives under the Patent Laws: Overreaching Harms U.S. 
Economic and Technological Interests, 21 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1215, 1286–88 (2006). Al-
though other commentators use the term more broadly. See Jeremiah S. Helm, Comment, Why 
Pharmaceutical Firms Support Patent Trolls: The Disparate Impact of eBay v. MercExchange 
on Innovation, 13 Mich. Telecomm. Tech. L. Rev. 331, 338–41 (2006) (accusing a pharma-
ceutical firm of troll-like behavior).  
At oral argument in eBay, Justice Kennedy asked whether the troll analogy referred to 
the fishing technique or the toll-collecting creature from folk tales. Transcript of Oral Argu-
ment at 26, eBay, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (No. 05-130) (“Well, is—is the troll the scary thing under 
the bridge, or is it a fishing technique?”), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_ 
arguments/argument_transcripts/05-130.pdf. Although eBay’s counsel did not supply a defi-
nite answer, id., the general understanding by those who use the term is the troll under the 
bridge. See, e.g., Farrand, supra, at 1287 n. 171 (quoting representatives of Microsoft using 
the term in this way). One reason to be skeptical about claims of irreparable harm made by 
such entities is that often they acquire older patents without significant market value other 
than as a basis for threatening litigation. See id. at 1288–89. The poster child for this phe-
nomenon is a case that Intel’s David Simon highlighted in congressional testimony in which a 
firm, TechSearch, had acquired a patent for $50,000 and then threatened to sue Intel for $5 
billion. See Brenda Sandburg, A Modest Proposal, The Recorder, May 9, 2005, http:// 
www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1115370308794.  
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transaction costs attendant to licensing or settlement discussions, asym-
metry between the risks faced by the accused infringer and a non-
practicing patentee opens the opportunity for strategic behavior by the 
patentee.57 The facts suggest that eBay was just such a case.58 
Indeed, Judge Bryson, author of the Federal Circuit’s eBay opinion, 
previously recognized in connection with preliminary injunctive relief:  
Although a patentee’s failure to practice an invention does not 
necessarily defeat the patentee’s claim of irreparable harm, the 
lack of commercial activity by the patentee is a significant factor 
in the calculus. Because [the patentee] does not compete with 
[the alleged infringer] or have licensees who could be injured by 
competition from [the alleged infringer], [the patentee] does not 
run the risk of losses of sales or goodwill in the market; nor has 
[the patentee] suggested that [the alleged infringer’s] activities 
have precluded it from licensing its patent or entering the mar-
ket.59  
There is thus precedent in the Federal Circuit for recognizing that one 
size does not fit all. A relatively mature patent for which no productive 
licenses have been taken is likely to lack market value unless it repre-
sents such an advance in its field that the market is only now in a 
position to put the invention into practice. Absent such an advance, the 
non-practicing entity’s interest in its exclusive rights is limited to the 
licensing revenues that could be extracted from those who independently 
invent technologies on which the patent reads or from willful infringers. 
In either case, a damage award, including an award of a reasonable roy-
alty, is more likely to be adequate than in other cases. Other equitable 
considerations, such as the public interest, may lead a court to enjoin the 
willful infringer in such circumstances, but the infringer’s willfulness 
does not undermine the remedial adequacy of damages. 
2. Weighing the Balance of Hardships 
If the plaintiff has established that a monetary award alone would 
risk leaving it substantially undercompensated, the court must then turn 
to the effects that an injunction would have on the defendant. If a 
                                                                                                                      
 57. Thanks to Peter Menell for this point. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 52, at 13–
14 (showing the dangers of hold up that result from a presumption of irreparable harm in favor 
of non-practicing entities not engaged in productive licensing).  
 58. See Menell, supra note 27, at 20–25 (describing the background of the case). 
 59. See High Tech Med. Instrumentation, Inc. v. New Image Indus., Inc., 49 F.3d 1551, 
1556 (Fed. Cir. 1995); cf. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Daffy’s Inc., 354 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating 
that in trademark cases, “grounds for irreparable injury include loss of control of reputation, 
loss of trade, and loss of goodwill.”). 
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permanent injunction would inflict a hardship out of proportion to the 
harm done to the plaintiff, the court must make a judgment about which 
of the two hardships would be worse. Making such a judgment is 
quintessentially an exercise of equitable discretion.  
Justice Kennedy’s plurality concurrence identified two classes of 
150 
cases in which a presumption of uniformity is particularly misplaced 
because the hardship to the defendant will be particularly acute: 
(1) when the patented invention is but a small component of the product 
the defendant seeks to produce; and (2) when the patent in suit teaches a 
business method because such patents are sometimes potentially vague 
or of suspect validity.60 The first of these classes is well defined for func-
tional analysis of the traditional equitable factors. The concern about 
business method patents, however, requires some adjustment to provide 
functional insight. 
Patent is Small Component. Justice Kennedy expressed concern 
that where the patentee’s invention is only a small component of the de-
fendant’s product, “the threat of an injunction is employed simply for 
undue leverage in negotiations.”61 Whether a component is a small input 
should be assessed both quantitatively and qualitatively. In a limited 
number of cases, the invention may be quantitatively small, but qualita-
tively it may be the “heart” of the product insofar as it is the primary 
source of the product’s market value.62 
Where a patented invention is quantitatively and qualitatively small, 
the leverage of a threatened injunction is “undue” because the defendant 
faces the prospect of being denied a return on its investments in all of the 
other inputs that have lawfully been bundled for distribution or use.63 
Thus, the focus of concern in the small-component cases should not be 
whether the patentee may enjoy a windfall but whether an injunction 
would serve to disproportionately harm the defendant in relation to its 
lawful use of the other inputs into the product or process.64 
                                                                                                                      
 60. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1842. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Cf. Harper & Row, Pub., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1985) (holding 
that factor of copyright law’s fair use doctrine directed to the amount and substantiality of 
copying weighs in the copyright owner’s favor if the “heart” of a work was copied). 
 63. Members of the public would also suffer from being denied access to the lawful 
components of the defendant’s product or service, but this non-party harm is measured under 
the public interest factor. 
 64. See, e.g., z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp.2d 437, 439, 441 (E.D. 
Tex. 2006) (rejecting patentee’s request for permanent injunction where infringed product 
activation software was a small component of Microsoft’s Windows XP and where patentee 
sought an injunction that would have required “Microsoft to deactivate the servers that control 
product activation for Microsoft’s infringing products and to re-design its Windows and Office 
software products to eliminate the infringing technology”), appeal filed, z4 Techs., Inc. v. 
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Moreover, in many small-component cases, the other inputs are 
likely to be patented inventions owned by, or licensed to, the defendant.65 
From the perspective of the patent system, an injunction in favor of the 
small-component patentee may well be robbing Peter to pay Paul. 
Whether this is true, the hardship to the defendant will generally turn on 
the ease with which the defendant can find and implement a lawful sub-
stitute for the infringing component.66 
Finally, the defendant’s hardship may include the potential for fol-
low on litigation due to uncertainty over the scope of any injunction that 
may issue. For example, in the argument before the Court, eBay’s coun-
sel, Carter Phillips, argued that an injunction would impose an undue 
hardship because eBay already had committed to implementing a non-
infringing substitute for MercExchange’s process, but uncertainty about 
the scope of any injunction would likely invite follow-on litigation over 
the legality of the substitute.67 
Vagueness and Doubtful Validity. A second class of case in 
which the district court should be particularly attentive to the potential 
hardship to the defendant involves patents of uncertain scope, either be-
cause of the breadth of the claim language, the subject matter of the 
invention, or because of a barely-descriptive or barely-enabling disclo-
sure. Here, a slight translation is needed to give effect to Justice 
Kennedy’s welcome concern about “the burgeoning number of patents 
over business methods, which were not of much economic and legal sig-
nificance in earlier times.”68 
Treating business method patents as a distinct class for purposes of in-
junctive relief is likely to be both over- and under-inclusive. On the one 
hand, routinely denying injunctive relief to owners of business method 
patents would only indirectly address larger issues if it now appears that it 
                                                                                                                      
Microsoft Corp., Nos. 06-1638, 06-1640 (Fed. Cir. Sep. 22, 2006); Brett M. Frischmann & 
Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 257, 292–93 (2007) (“[P]articularly in cir-
cumstances where the defendant or third parties made significant contributions to the success 
of the product, social welfare requires that they be entitled to continue to make use of that 
product.”).  
 65. See Federal Trade Commission, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Bal-
ance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy Executive Summary, at 6 (2003) (“In 
some industries, such as computer hardware and software, firms can require access to dozens, 
hundreds, or even thousands of patents to produce just one commercial product.) available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf. 
 66. Where substitution is feasible, the court can address the defendant’s hardship by 
staying its injunction for a reasonable period and award a reasonable royalty for use during 
this period. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 52 at 35–36 (arguing in favor of this approach). 
 67. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 56, at 17–22 (argument of Mr. Phil-
lips). 
 68. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1842 (2006). 
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was a bad policy to interpret § 10169 to read on methods of doing busi-
ness or if the quality of such patents is systematically dubious. These 
problems would be better addressed directly through interpretation of, or 
amendments to, § 101 or through more thoroughgoing patent examina-
tion. 
On the other hand, the relevant concern often raised in connection 
with business method patents is with the potential hardship to a defen-
dant that has run afoul of a patent of vague or uncertain scope. It may 
not be immediately obvious why the general uncertainty surrounding a 
particular patent’s scope should be relevant in the injunction inquiry. By 
this stage of the proceeding the patent has been held valid, and the de-
fendant’s actions have been determined to have been within the patent’s 
scope. 
The reason that general uncertainty about scope remains relevant is 
because the court’s assessment of defendant’s hardship asks whether im-
posing the full costs of complying with an injunction would be fair. In 
turn, this fairness inquiry focuses in part on the ease with which the de-
fendant could have avoided infringement. For example, the court will 
not, and should not, credit a defendant’s claim of hardship in a case in 
which the defendant infringed because it invested in manufacturing a 
product that incorporates a well defined mechanical invention that could 
have been readily identified with a competent patent search. 
In contrast, the court will assign greater weight to the defendant’s 
hardship if the defendant infringed after having conducted a reasonable 
patent search and having remained reasonably uncertain about whether a 
business method or software patent, for example, would be held to cover 
the defendant’s process or product.70 Thus, courts should routinely in-
quire into the difficulties of ascertaining the boundaries of the patent in 
                                                                                                                      
 69. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2004) (defining patentable subject matter). 
 70. Indeed, this point was implicit in the oral argument in eBay. The district court had 
denied injunctive relief in partial reliance on a general concern about business method patents, 
which it expressed as part of its public interest analysis. The Justices explored whether eBay 
embraced this reasoning. Under questioning from Chief Justice Roberts, eBay’s counsel dis-
tanced himself from the district court’s reasoning. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra 
note at 56, at 14–16. Justice Kennedy rejoined: 
JUSTICE KENNEDY: . . . . But the—the business process point you give away 
fairly quickly. I—I thought that was rather substantial. The whole point is, is that a 
business process patent is—is difficult to define and could be very—it can be very 
restrictive. 
MR. PHILLIPS: . . . I—I think in a proper case—and I don’t think you can do it 
under the—under the public interest analysis. I think you probably end up doing it 
under the balance of hardships. . . . 
Id. at 15–16. 
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suit when balancing the hardships. This inquiry is likely to highlight in-
dustry-specific or technology-specific patterns.71 
Indeed, Congress has already shown some solicitude for the unwit-
ting infringer. In the case of a reissued patent, section 252 of the Patent 
Act protects an infringer’s detrimental reliance by immunizing any 
manufacture, sale, offer of sale, use or import of the invention prior to 
the date of reissue, and by granting the court equitable discretion to pro-
tect such reliance with respect to any post-issue conduct.72 Analogously, 
then, the potential hardship of an injunction to an unwitting infringer 
should favor either withholding injunctive relief or a stay for a reason-
able period sufficient to permit the infringer to recoup the costs of 
detrimental reliance on the invention. 
In sum, if a patentee has demonstrated that it will be harmed irrepa-
rably if the defendant is not enjoined, the court should then attend to the 
consequences of an injunction on the defendant. In many, if not most, 
cases, the defendant’s hardship is unlikely to outweigh that of the pat-
entee. However, the court should be particularly receptive to a 
defendant’s claim of hardship when the patentee’s invention comprises 
only a small component of the defendant’s product or process or when 
the scope of the patentee’s invention is difficult to ascertain ex ante. 
3. The Public Interest 
After having evaluated the stakes from the parties’ perspectives, the 
court must then consider the interests of non-parties likely to be affected 
by issuance of a permanent injunction. Once again, one size does not fit 
all. Although occasionally derided as a “make weight” in equitable pro-
ceedings,73 the public interest factor is particularly salient in intellectual 
                                                                                                                      
 71. See, e.g., Peter Menell, A Method for Reforming the Patent System, 13 Mich. Tech. 
Telecomm L. Rev. 487, 506 (2007) (“The boundaries of software and business method pat-
ents are inherently ambiguous.”).  
 72. See 35 U.S.C. § 252. Thanks to Peter Menell for this point. Specifically, with re-
spect to post-reissue infringement, section 252 provides: 
The court before which such matter is in question may provide for the continued 
manufacture, use, offer for sale, or sale of the thing made, purchased, offered for 
sale, used, or imported as specified, or for the manufacture, use, offer for sale, or 
sale in the United States of which substantial preparation was made before the grant 
of the reissue, and the court may also provide for the continued practice of any 
process patented by the reissue that is practiced, or for the practice of which sub-
stantial preparation was made, before the grant of the reissue, to the extent and 
under such terms as the court deems equitable for the protection of investments 
made or business commenced before the grant of the reissue. 
Id. 
 73. See, e.g., Arthur D. Wolf, Preliminary Injunctions: The Varying Standards, 7 W. 
New Eng. L. Rev. 173, 183–228 (1984); 
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property cases because the very point of granting the owner a right to 
exclude is to encourage investments that will serve the public interest. 
Whether the public interest would be disserved by issuance of an injunc-
tion in a particular patent case requires some attention to whether the 
public’s short term or long term interests are more salient.  
The public’s short term interest will generally weigh against injunc-
tive relief. In many settings, the presence of the infringer in the market 
will present consumers with greater choices or lower prices because the 
infringer will be allowed to compete with the patentee in ways that the 
patentee wishes to exclude.74 Under rare circumstances, such as a public 
health crisis, the infringer’s entry into the market also may be necessary 
to meet exigent demand. However, in the long term, routine denials of 
injunctive relief would devalue patent rights—a result that would un-
dermine the goal of granting patents in the first place. 
When assessing the trade-off between the public’s short term and 
long term interests—static versus dynamic efficiency—the court must 
have some basis for assessing the signal it would send to future inventors 
if it were to deny injunctive relief.75 This assessment really cannot be 
done solely on the basis of the facts in a particular case because it is too 
difficult to ascertain how an individual data point—the case at bar—is 
likely to influence the inventing community’s perception’s about how 
well the patent system is functioning. 
This does not mean, however, that the public interest always favors 
injunctive relief. Instead, the court should assess the trade off between 
the public’s short term and long term interests in relation to the field of 
invention and its relation to industry or technology. The patent system is 
not monolithic. In some industries, the public’s short term interest will 
be stronger because a denial of injunctive relief is unlikely to undermine 
incentives to innovate. The converse is true in other industries. 
In order to assess whether an injunction would disserve the public 
interest, the trial court will require access to legislative facts76 about the 
                                                                                                                      
 74. For a dramatic version of this argument in the preliminary injunction context, see 
Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 470 F.3d 1368, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Apotex, in particu-
lar, contends that if the generic products were removed from the market, consumers would be 
inclined not to purchase their medication because of the accompanying price increase for the 
brand name drug, leading to possible deaths.”). 
 75. See, e.g., Ramsey Shehadeh & Marion B. Stewart, An Economic Approach To The 
“Balance Of Hardships” And “Public Interest” Tests For Preliminary Injunction Motions In 
Patent Infringement Cases, 83 J. Pat. & Trademark Office Soc’y 341 (2001) (discussing 
role of public interest prong of preliminary injunction standard in assessing the trade-offs 
between static and dynamic efficiency in patent cases).  
 76. See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administra-
tive Process, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 364, 402 (1942) (introducing legislative/adjudicative fact 
terminology); United States v. Gould, 536 F.2d 216, 220 (8th Cir. 1976) (“Legislative facts are 
established truths, facts or pronouncements that do not change from case to case but apply 
CARROLL  NEW TYPE.DOC 4/17/2007  11:06 AM 
Spring 2007] Patent Injunctions 441 
 
way different industries relate to the patent system. The two most com-
mon sources for these facts will be administrative agency reports and 
expert testimony. For example, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in eBay 
relied on a 2003 report by the Federal Trade Commission to inform his 
understanding that traditional practice with respect to patent injunctions 
would give little aid in relation to a new industry that uses patents pri-
marily to extract licensing revenue rather than as a basis for producing or 
selling goods.77 
Courts are rightfully skeptical of the value of dueling experts in 
many situations. Nonetheless, experts play a critical role in presenting 
legislative fact,78 and imbalances in the presentation of legislative facts 
have been shown to influence outcomes.79 For example, in Sanofi-
Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc.,80 the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s 
reliance on a brand name drug manufacturer’s expert in holding that the 
public interest favored a preliminary injunction against a generic drug 
manufacturer. The plaintiff’s expert testified that the average cost of de-
veloping a blockbuster drug is $800 million and that the patent system 
provided incentives to pharmaceutical companies to continue costly de-
velopment efforts.81 
These assertions of legislative fact apparently went unchallenged be-
low, even though the $800 million figure has been widely challenged by 
industry critics.82 While in the case of pharmaceutical patents, the public 
interest probably does generally favor injunctive relief for infringement 
even if the critics’ figures are correct, one result of eBay should be that 
district courts become more self-conscious of the legislative facts neces-
sary for an assessment of the public interest and that they should demand 
                                                                                                                      
universally, while adjudicative facts are those developed in a particular case.”); Robert E. 
Keeton, Legislative Facts and Similar Things: Deciding Disputed Premise Facts, 73 Minn. L. 
Rev. 1, 11 (1988) (using term “premise facts” as alternative to emphasize presence and func-
tion of facts relied upon but not ascertained through adjudication of the case at bar.); Kenneth 
L. Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 Sup. Ct. Rev. 75, 77 (courts 
need “to be informed on matters far beyond the facts of the particular case.”). Some commen-
tators have identified a hybrid category of “social framework” facts that incorporate legislative 
facts into an adjudicative finding. See John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Frameworks: 
A New Use of Social Science In Law, 73 Va. L. Rev. 559 (1987). 
 77. See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 126 U.S. 1837, 1842 (2006). 
 78. Peggy C. Davis, “There is a Book Out . . .”: An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of 
Legislative Facts, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1539 (1987) 
 79. Id. at 1548–49; see also Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against The Best Interest 
of the Child, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 10–11 (1987) (also discussing role of legislative fact in 
child custody disputes). 
 80. 470 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 81. See id. at 1383. 
 82. See generally, e.g., Merrill Goozner, The $800 Million Pill: The Truth 
behind the Cost of New Drugs (2004) (claiming that the true cost of development is closer 
to $100 million). 
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better information concerning these facts. Indeed, a court should be will-
ing to appoint its own expert witness, if need be, to ascertain legislative 
facts concerning the public’s interest in a permanent injunction proceed-
ing. 
4. Guidelines 
In eBay, the Court held that district courts must exercise equitable 
discretion on a case by case basis because the harm caused by patent 
infringement is not uniform. The analysis above shows that the tradi-
tional equitable factors generally will favor issuance of a permanent 
injunction when a valid patent has been infringed. However, there are 
certain facts that, if present, should cause a court to be skeptical about 
the propriety of injunctive relief. It would be improper under the tradi-
tional framework to create evidentiary presumptions that would 
hamstring equitable discretion, but a busy trial court is entitled to look 
for patterns to orient itself and to ensure that like cases are treated alike. 
The analysis above suggests that when assessing the first two fac-
tors, courts should be inclined to find irreparable injury when the patent 
owner is participating in the market for the invention, either by its own 
practice or through exclusive licensing arrangements. Where the patent 
owner is not practicing the invention or when the owner has not engaged 
in productive licensing, a court should be more skeptical that an injunc-
tion is a necessary remedy to repair the harm caused by infringement. 
When balancing the hardships, the court should consider the infring-
ing product or process from the defendant’s perspective. Where there is a 
high patent-to-product ratio or where the infringed patent otherwise 
comprises a qualitatively and quantitatively small component of the in-
fringing product or process, an injunction is more likely to impose an 
undue hardship on the defendant. 
In addition, the defendant’s hardship should be given greater weight 
when the scope of the patent is difficult to ascertain; inventions in some 
fields are harder to capture in claim language than others. In addition, 
the patentee may have contributed to uncertainty about scope through 
ambiguous drafting or barely-adequate disclosure. Whatever the reason, 
an injunction becomes less equitable as uncertainty increases because of 
the greater likelihood that the defendant will be forced to sacrifice in-
vestments that were reasonably made under the circumstances. 
Finally, the public interest factor is of greater significance in patent 
cases than in others because it is directly implicated by patent enforce-
ment practices. Patent infringers usually provide a short term public 
benefit by increasing the supply of goods or services embodying the in-
vention in the marketplace. This increased supply tends to bring down 
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prices or increase consumer choice. However, in the long term, un-
checked infringement is likely to harm incentives to invest in patent 
protection. The court must assess this trade-off to determine whether an 
injunction would disserve the public. By necessity, the court will require 
access to legislative facts about the role of patents in the particular field 
or industry at issue. In particular, the court should seek evidence from 
administrative reports or from expert testimony about the relative impor-
tance of injunctive relief in the industry or field likely to be affected by 
the court’s decision. 
Conclusion 
The Court’s decision in eBay is a welcome course correction that 
highlights the importance of context in the functioning of the U.S. patent 
system. Recent expansions in the subject matter of patent law combined 
with the growing importance of the economic effects of patents suggest 
that other aspects of patent law would also benefit from more explicit 
context sensitivity. 
Going forward, district courts and the Federal Circuit should attend 
to the functional considerations relevant in the patent context to the tra-
ditional four-factor inquiry. A uniform approach to injunctions increases 
the social costs of the patent system. But the diversity of issues raised in 
equitable proceedings is not infinite. While each case will come to court 
with its own equities, salient facts are likely to be repeated. It would 
therefore be appropriate for patterns of injunctive relief to emerge in 
which the cases cluster based on industry, technology, or entity. 
